Goto

Collaborating Authors

Applications of Linear Defeasible Logic: combining resource consumption and exceptions to energy management and business processes

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Linear Logic and Defeasible Logic have been adopted to formalise different features of knowledge representation: consumption of resources, and non monotonic reasoning in particular to represent exceptions. Recently, a framework to combine sub-structural features, corresponding to the consumption of resources, with defeasibility aspects to handle potentially conflicting information, has been discussed in literature, by some of the authors. Two applications emerged that are very relevant: energy management and business process management. We illustrate a set of guide lines to determine how to apply linear defeasible logic to those contexts.


Computing Strong and Weak Permissions in Defeasible Logic

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent and compute three concepts of defeasible permission. In particular, we discuss different types of explicit permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations. Moreover, we show how strong permissions can be represented both with, and without introducing a new consequence relation for inferring conclusions from explicit permissive norms. Finally, we illustrate how a preference operator applicable to contrary-to-duty obligations can be combined with a new operator representing ordered sequences of strong permissions which derogate from prohibitions. The logical system is studied from a computational standpoint and is shown to have liner computational complexity.


The Rationale behind the Concept of Goal

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

The paper proposes a fresh look at the concept of goal and advances that motivational attitudes like desire, goal and intention are just facets of the broader notion of (acceptable) outcome. We propose to encode the preferences of an agent as sequences of "alternative acceptable outcomes". We then study how the agent's beliefs and norms can be used to filter the mental attitudes out of the sequences of alternative acceptable outcomes. Finally, we formalise such intuitions in a novel Modal Defeasible Logic and we prove that the resulting formalisation is computationally feasible.


Revision of Defeasible Logic Preferences

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

There are several contexts of non-monotonic reasoning where a priority between rules is established whose purpose is preventing conflicts. One formalism that has been widely employed for non-monotonic reasoning is the sceptical one known as Defeasible Logic. In Defeasible Logic the tool used for conflict resolution is a preference relation between rules, that establishes the priority among them. In this paper we investigate how to modify such a preference relation in a defeasible logic theory in order to change the conclusions of the theory itself. We argue that the approach we adopt is applicable to legal reasoning where users, in general, cannot change facts or rules, but can propose their preferences about the relative strength of the rules. We provide a comprehensive study of the possible combinatorial cases and we identify and analyse the cases where the revision process is successful. After this analysis, we identify three revision/update operators and study them against the AGM postulates for belief revision operators, to discover that only a part of these postulates are satisfied by the three operators.


A Comparative Study of Some Central Notions of ASPIC+ and DeLP

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

This paper formally compares some central notions from two well-known formalisms for rule-based argumentation, DeLP and ASPIC+. The comparisons especially focus on intuitive adequacy and inter-translatability, consistency, and closure properties. As for differences in the definitions of arguments and attack, it turns out that DeLP's definitions are intuitively appealing but that they may not fully comply with Caminada and Amgoud's rationality postulates of strict closure and indirect consistency. For some special cases, the DeLP definitions are shown to fare better than ASPIC+. Next, it is argued that there are reasons to consider a variant of DeLP with grounded semantics, since in some examples its current notion of warrant arguably has counterintuitive consequences and may lead to sets of warranted arguments that are not admissible. Finally, under some minimality and consistency assumptions on ASPIC+ arguments, a one-to-many correspondence between ASPIC+ arguments and DeLP arguments is identified in such a way that if the DeLP warranting procedure is changed to grounded semantics, then DeLP notion of warrant and ASPIC+'s notion of justification are equivalent. This result is proven for three alternative definitions of attack.