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Sequent-Type Calculi for Systems of Nonmonotonic Paraconsistent Logics

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Paraconsistent logics constitute an important class of formalisms dealing with non-trivial reasoning from inconsistent premisses. In this paper, we introduce uniform axiomatisations for a family of nonmonotonic paraconsistent logics based on minimal inconsistency in terms of sequent-type proof systems. The latter are prominent and widely-used forms of calculi well-suited for analysing proof search. In particular, we provide sequent-type calculi for Priest's three-valued minimally inconsistent logic of paradox, and for four-valued paraconsistent inference relations due to Arieli and Avron. Our calculi follow the sequent method first introduced in the context of nonmonotonic reasoning by Bonatti and Olivetti, whose distinguishing feature is the use of a so-called rejection calculus for axiomatising invalid formulas. In fact, we present a general method to obtain sequent systems for any many-valued logic based on minimal inconsistency, yielding the calculi for the logics of Priest and of Arieli and Avron as special instances.


Answers to Imamura Note on the Definition of Neutrosophic Logic

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In order to more accurately situate and fit the neutrosophic logic into the framework of nonstandard analysis, we present the neutrosophic inequalities, neutrosophic equality, neutrosophic infimum and supremum, neutrosophic standard intervals, including the cases when the neutrosophic logic standard and nonstandard components T, I, F get values outside of the classical real unit interval [0, 1], and a brief evolution of neutrosophic operators. The paper intends to answer Imamura criticism that we found benefic in better understanding the nonstandard neutrosophic logic, although the nonstandard neutrosophic logic was never used in practical applications.


Bi-modal G\"odel logic over [0,1]-valued Kripke frames

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We consider the G\"odel bi-modal logic determined by fuzzy Kripke models where both the propositions and the accessibility relation are infinitely valued over the standard G\"odel algebra [0,1] and prove strong completeness of Fischer Servi intuitionistic modal logic IK plus the prelinearity axiom with respect to this semantics. We axiomatize also the bi-modal analogues of $T,$ $S4,$ and $S5$ obtained by restricting to models over frames satisfying the [0,1]-valued versions of the structural properties which characterize these logics. As application of the completeness theorems we obtain a representation theorem for bi-modal G\"odel algebras.


An Introduction to Fuzzy & Annotated Semantic Web Languages

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We present the state of the art in representing and reasoning with fuzzy knowledge in Semantic Web Languages such as triple languages RDF/RDFS, conceptual languages of the OWL 2 family and rule languages. We further show how one may generalise them to so-called annotation domains, that cover also e.g.


Reasoning about Fuzzy Belief and Common Belief: With Emphasis on Incomparable Beliefs

AAAI Conferences

We formalize reasoning about fuzzy belief and fuzzy common belief, especially incomparable beliefs, in multi-agent systems by using a logical system based on Fitting's many-valued modal logic, where incomparable beliefs mean beliefs whose degrees are not totally ordered. Completeness and decidability results for the logic of fuzzy belief and common belief are established while implicitly exploiting the duality-theoretic perspective on Fitting's logic that builds upon the author's previous work. A conceptually novel feature is that incomparable beliefs and qualitative fuzziness can be formalized in the developed system, whereas they cannot be formalized in previously proposed systems for reasoning about fuzzy belief. We believe that belief degrees can ultimately be reduced to truth degrees, and we call this "the reduction thesis about belief degrees", which is assumed in the present paper and motivates an axiom of our system. We finally argue that fuzzy reasoning sheds new light on old epistemic issues such as coordinated attack problem.