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In Praise of Belief Bases: Doing Epistemic Logic Without Possible Worlds

AAAI Conferences

We introduce a new semantics for a logic of explicit and implicit beliefs based on the concept of multi-agent belief base. Differently from existing Kripke-style semantics for epistemic logic in which the notions of possible world and doxastic/epistemic alternative are primitive, in our semantics they are non-primitive but are defined from the concept of belief base. We provide a complete axiomatization and a decidability result for our logic.


PDT Logic: A Probabilistic Doxastic Temporal Logic for Reasoning about Beliefs in Multi-agent Systems

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

We present Probabilistic Doxastic Temporal (PDT) Logic, a formalism to represent and reason about probabilistic beliefs and their temporal evolution in multi-agent systems. This formalism enables the quantification of agents beliefs through probability intervals and incorporates an explicit notion of time. We discuss how over time agents dynamically change their beliefs in facts, temporal rules, and other agents beliefs with respect to any new information they receive. We introduce an appropriate formal semantics for PDT Logic and show that it is decidable. Alternative options of specifying problems in PDT Logic are possible. For these problem specifications, we develop different satisfiability checking algorithms and provide complexity results for the respective decision problems. The use of probability intervals enables a formal representation of probabilistic knowledge without enforcing (possibly incorrect) exact probability values. By incorporating an explicit notion of time, PDT Logic provides enriched possibilities to represent and reason about temporal relations.


Parametric Constructive Kripke-Semantics for Standard Multi-Agent Belief and Knowledge (Knowledge As Unbiased Belief)

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We propose parametric constructive Kripke-semantics for multi-agent KD45-belief and S5-knowledge in terms of elementary set-theoretic constructions of two basic functional building blocks, namely bias (or viewpoint) and visibility, functioning also as the parameters of the doxastic and epistemic accessibility relation. The doxastic accessibility relates two possible worlds whenever the application of the composition of bias with visibility to the first world is equal to the application of visibility to the second world. The epistemic accessibility is the transitive closure of the union of our doxastic accessibility and its converse. Therefrom, accessibility relations for common and distributed belief and knowledge can be constructed in a standard way. As a result, we obtain a general definition of knowledge in terms of belief that enables us to view S5-knowledge as accurate (unbiased and thus true) KD45-belief, negation-complete belief and knowledge as exact KD45-belief and S5-knowledge, respectively, and perfect S5-knowledge as precise (exact and accurate) KD45-belief, and all this generically for arbitrary functions of bias and visibility. Our results can be seen as a semantic complement to previous foundational results by Halpern et al. about the (un)definability and (non-)reducibility of knowledge in terms of and to belief, respectively.


The Doxastic Interpretation of Team Semantics

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We advance a doxastic interpretation for many of the logical connectives considered in Dependence Logic and in its extensions, and we argue that Team Semantics is a natural framework for reasoning about beliefs and belief updates.


Exploiting Belief Bases for Building Rich Epistemic Structures

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We introduce a semantics for epistemic logic exploiting a belief base abstraction. Differently from existing Kripke-style semantics for epistemic logic in which the notions of possible world and epistemic alternative are primitive, in the proposed semantics they are non-primitive but are defined from the concept of belief base. We show that this semantics allows us to define the universal epistemic model in a simpler and more compact way than existing inductive constructions of it. We provide (i) a number of semantic equivalence results for both the basic epistemic language with "individual belief" operators and its extension by the notion of "only believing", and (ii) a lower bound complexity result for epistemic logic model checking relative to the universal epistemic model.