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Learning from Learning Machines: Optimisation, Rules, and Social Norms

arXiv.org Machine Learning

There is an analogy between machine learning systems and economic entities in that they are both adaptive, and their behaviour is specified in a more-or-less explicit way. It appears that the area of AI that is most analogous to the behaviour of economic entities is that of morally good decision-making, but it is an open question as to how precisely moral behaviour can be achieved in an AI system. This paper explores the analogy between these two complex systems, and we suggest that a clearer understanding of this apparent analogy may help us forward in both the socio-economic domain and the AI domain: known results in economics may help inform feasible solutions in AI safety, but also known results in AI may inform economic policy. If this claim is correct, then the recent successes of deep learning for AI suggest that more implicit specifications work better than explicit ones for solving such problems.


Multi-Principal Assistance Games

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Assistance games (also known as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning games) have been proposed as a model for beneficial AI, wherein a robotic agent must act on behalf of a human principal but is initially uncertain about the humans payoff function. This paper studies multi-principal assistance games, which cover the more general case in which the robot acts on behalf of N humans who may have widely differing payoffs. Impossibility theorems in social choice theory and voting theory can be applied to such games, suggesting that strategic behavior by the human principals may complicate the robots task in learning their payoffs. We analyze in particular a bandit apprentice game in which the humans act first to demonstrate their individual preferences for the arms and then the robot acts to maximize the sum of human payoffs. We explore the extent to which the cost of choosing suboptimal arms reduces the incentive to mislead, a form of natural mechanism design. In this context we propose a social choice method that uses shared control of a system to combine preference inference with social welfare optimization.


Conservative Agency via Attainable Utility Preservation

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Reward functions are often misspecified. An agent optimizing an incorrect reward function can change its environment in large, undesirable, and potentially irreversible ways. Work on impact measurement seeks a means of identifying (and thereby avoiding) large changes to the environment. We propose a novel impact measure which induces conservative, effective behavior across a range of situations. The approach attempts to preserve the attainable utility of auxiliary objectives. We evaluate our proposal on an array of benchmark tasks and show that it matches or outperforms relative reachability, the state-of-the-art in impact measurement.


The Off-Switch Game

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.


REALab: An Embedded Perspective on Tampering

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Tampering problems, where an AI agent interferes with whatever represents or communicates its intended objective and pursues the resulting corrupted objective instead, are a staple concern in the AGI safety literature [Amodei et al., 2016, Bostrom, 2014, Everitt and Hutter, 2016, Everitt et al., 2017, Armstrong and O'Rourke, 2017, Everitt and Hutter, 2019, Armstrong et al., 2020]. Variations on the idea of tampering include wireheading, where an agent learns how to stimulate its reward mechanism directly, and the off-switch or shutdown problem, where an agent interferes with its supervisor's ability to halt the agent's operation. Many real-world concerns can be formulated as tampering problems, as we will show (§2.1, §4.1). However, what constitutes tampering can be tricky to define precisely, despite clear intuitions in specific cases. We have developed a platform, REALab, to model tampering problems.