In Belief Revision the new information is generally accepted, following the principle of primacy of update. In some case this behavior can be criticized and one could require that some new pieces of information can be rejected by the agent because, for instance, of insufficient plausibility. This has given rise to several approaches of non-prioritized Belief Revision. In particular (Hansson et al. 2001) defined credibility-limited revision operators, where a revision is accepted only if the new information is a formula that belongs to a set of credible formulas. They provide several representation theorems in the AGM style. In this work we study credibility-limited revision operators when the information is represented in propositional logic, like in the Katsuno and Mendelzon framework. We propose a set of postulates and a representation theorem for credibility-limited revision operators. Then we explore how to generalize these definitions to the Iterated Belief Revision case, using epistemic states in the Darwiche and Pearl style.
In this paper we study a kind of operator --known as credibility-limited base revisions-- which addresses two of the main issues that have been pointed out to the AGM model of belief change. Indeed, on the one hand, these operators are defined on belief bases (rather than belief sets) and, on the other hand, they are constructed with the underlying idea that not all new information is accepted. We propose twenty different classes of credibilitylimited base revision operators and obtain axiomatic characterizations for each of them. Additionally we thoroughly investigate the interrelations (in the sense of inclusion) among all those classes. More precisely, we analyse whether each one of those classes is or is not (strictly) contained in each of the remaining ones.
In this article, we consider iteration principles for contraction, with the goal of identifying properties for contractions that respect conditional beliefs. Therefore, we investigate and evaluate four groups of iteration principles for contraction which consider the dynamics of conditional beliefs. For all these principles, we provide semantic characterization theorems and provide formulations by postulates which highlight how the change of beliefs and of conditional beliefs is constrained, whenever that is possible. The first group is similar to the syntactic Darwiche-Pearl postulates. As a second group, we consider semantic postulates for iteration of contraction by Chopra, Ghose, Meyer and Wong, and by Konieczny and Pino P\'erez, respectively, and we provide novel syntactic counterparts. Third, we propose a contraction analogue of the independence condition by Jin and Thielscher. For the fourth group, we consider natural and moderate contraction by Nayak. Methodically, we make use of conditionals for contractions, so-called contractionals and furthermore, we propose and employ the novel notion of $ \alpha $-equivalence for formulating some of the new postulates.
As partial justification of their framework for iterated belief revision Darwiche and Pearl convincingly argued against Boutilier's natural revision and provided a prototypical revision operator that fits into their scheme. We show that the Darwiche-Pearl arguments lead naturally to the acceptance of a smaller class of operators which we refer to as admissible. Admissible revision ensures that the penultimate input is not ignored completely, thereby eliminating natural revision, but includes the Darwiche-Pearl operator, Nayak's lexicographic revision operator, and a newly introduced operator called restrained revision. We demonstrate that restrained revision is the most conservative of admissible revision operators, effecting as few changes as possible, while lexicographic revision is the least conservative, and point out that restrained revision can also be viewed as a composite operator, consisting of natural revision preceded by an application of a "backwards revision" operator previously studied by Papini. Finally, we propose the establishment of a principled approach for choosing an appropriate revision operator in different contexts and discuss future work.
According to Boutillier, Darwiche and Pearl and others, principles for iterated revision can be characterised in terms of changing beliefs about conditionals. For iterated contraction a similar formulation is not known. This is especially because for iterated belief change the connection between revision and contraction via the Levi and Harper identity is not straightforward, and therefore, characterisation results do not transfer easily between iterated revision and contraction. In this article, we develop an axiomatisation of iterated contraction in terms of changing conditional beliefs. We prove that the new set of postulates conforms semantically to the class of operators like the ones given by Konieczny and Pino Pérez for iterated contraction. 1 Introduction For the three main classes of theory change, revision, expansion and contraction, different characterisations are known , which are heavily supported by the correspondence between revision and contraction via the Levi and Harper identities [13, 17].