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Credibility-limited Base Revision: New Classes and Their Characterizations

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

In this paper we study a kind of operator --known as credibility-limited base revisions-- which addresses two of the main issues that have been pointed out to the AGM model of belief change. Indeed, on the one hand, these operators are defined on belief bases (rather than belief sets) and, on the other hand, they are constructed with the underlying idea that not all new information is accepted. We propose twenty different classes of credibilitylimited base revision operators and obtain axiomatic characterizations for each of them. Additionally we thoroughly investigate the interrelations (in the sense of inclusion) among all those classes. More precisely, we analyse whether each one of those classes is or is not (strictly) contained in each of the remaining ones.


Booth

AAAI Conferences

In Belief Revision the new information is generally accepted, following the principle of primacy of update. In some case this behavior can be criticized and one could require that some new pieces of information can be rejected by the agent because, for instance, of insufficient plausibility. This has given rise to several approaches of non-prioritized Belief Revision. In particular (Hansson et al. 2001) defined credibility-limited revision operators, where a revision is accepted only if the new information is a formula that belongs to a set of credible formulas. They provide several representation theorems in the AGM style. In this work we study credibility-limited revision operators when the information is represented in propositional logic, like in the Katsuno and Mendelzon framework. We propose a set of postulates and a representation theorem for credibility-limited revision operators. Then we explore how to generalize these definitions to the Iterated Belief Revision case, using epistemic states in the Darwiche and Pearl style.


Credibility-Limited Revision Operators in Propositional Logic

AAAI Conferences

In Belief Revision the new information is generally accepted, following the principle of primacy of update. In some case this behavior can be criticized and one could require that some new pieces of information can be rejected by the agent because, for instance, of insufficient plausibility. This has given rise to several approaches of non-prioritized Belief Revision. In particular (Hansson et al. 2001) defined credibility-limited revision operators, where a revision is accepted only if the new information is a formula that belongs to a set of credible formulas. They provide several representation theorems in the AGM style. In this work we study credibility-limited revision operators when the information is represented in propositional logic, like in the Katsuno and Mendelzon framework. We propose a set of postulates and a representation theorem for credibility-limited revision operators. Then we explore how to generalize these definitions to the Iterated Belief Revision case, using epistemic states in the Darwiche and Pearl style.


On Strengthening the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision: Proper Ordinal Interval Operators

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Darwiche and Pearl's seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. Most of the suggestions made have resulted in a form of `reductionism' that identifies belief states with orderings of worlds. However, this position has recently been criticised as being unacceptably strong. Other proposals, such as the popular principle (P), aka `Independence', characteristic of `admissible' revision operators, remain commendably more modest. In this paper, we supplement both the DP postulates and (P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We show that operators from the resulting family, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision, can be represented as relating belief states that are associated with a `proper ordinal interval' (POI) assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a simple ordering of worlds. We close the paper by noting that these operators satisfy iterated versions of a large number of AGM era postulates, including Superexpansion, that are not sound for admissible operators in general.


Ma

AAAI Conferences

Belief revision studies strategies about how agents revise their belief states when receiving new evidence. Both in classical belief revision and in epistemic revision, a new input is either in the form of a (weighted) propositional formula or a total pre-order (where the total pre-order is considered as a whole). However, in some real-world applications, a new input can be a partial pre-order where each unit that constitutes the partial pre-order is important and should be considered individually. To address this issue, in this paper, we study how a partial pre-order representing the prior epistemic state can be revised by another partial pre-order (the new input) from a different perspective, where the revision is conducted recursively on the individual units of partial pre-orders. We propose different revision operators (rules), dubbed the extension, match, inner and outer revision operators, from different revision points of view. We also analyze several properties for these operators.