Takabatake, Kazuya, Akaho, Shotaro

In this paper, we propose a simple, versatile model for learning the structure and parameters of multivariate distributions from a data set. Learning a Markov network from a given data set is not a simple problem, because Markov networks rigorously represent Markov properties, and this rigor imposes complex constraints on the design of the networks. Our proposed model removes these constraints, acquiring important aspects from the information geometry. The proposed parameter- and structure-learning algorithms are simple to execute as they are based solely on local computation at each node. Experiments demonstrate that our algorithms work appropriately.

Casgrain, Philippe, Jaimungal, Sebastian

Alpha signals for statistical arbitrage strategies are often driven by latent factors. This paper analyses how to optimally trade with latent factors that cause prices to jump and diffuse. Moreover, we account for the effect of the trader's actions on quoted prices and the prices they receive from trading. Under fairly general assumptions, we demonstrate how the trader can learn the posterior distribution over the latent states, and explicitly solve the latent optimal trading problem. We provide a verification theorem, and a methodology for calibrating the model by deriving a variation of the expectation-maximization algorithm. To illustrate the efficacy of the optimal strategy, we demonstrate its performance through simulations and compare it to strategies which ignore learning in the latent factors. We also provide calibration results for a particular model using Intel Corporation stock as an example.

Mazzarisi, Piero, Barucca, Paolo, Lillo, Fabrizio, Tantari, Daniele

We propose a dynamic network model where two mechanisms control the probability of a link between two nodes: (i) the existence or absence of this link in the past, and (ii) node-specific latent variables (dynamic fitnesses) describing the propensity of each node to create links. Assuming a Markov dynamics for both mechanisms, we propose an Expectation-Maximization algorithm for model estimation and inference of the latent variables. The estimated parameters and fitnesses can be used to forecast the presence of a link in the future. We apply our methodology to the e-MID interbank network for which the two linkage mechanisms are associated with two different trading behaviors in the process of network formation, namely preferential trading and trading driven by node-specific characteristics. The empirical results allow to recognise preferential lending in the interbank market and indicate how a method that does not account for time-varying network topologies tends to overestimate preferential linkage.

Panella, Alessandro (University of Illinois at Chicago)

When operating in stochastic, partially observable, multiagent settings, it is crucial to accurately predict the actions of other agents. In my thesis work, I propose methodologies for learning the policy of external agents from their observed behavior, in the form of finite state controllers. To perform this task, I adopt Bayesian learning algorithms based on nonparametric prior distributions, that provide the flexibility required to infer models of unknown complexity. These methods are to be embedded in decision making frameworks for autonomous planning in partially observable multiagent systems.

We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents engaged in an infinite horizon partially observable stochastic game as formalized by the interactive POMDP framework. We show that when agents' initial beliefs satisfy a truth compatibility condition, their behavior converges to a subjective ɛ-equilibrium in a finite time, and subjective equilibrium in the limit. This result is a generalization of a similar result in repeated games, to partially observable stochastic games. However, it turns out that the equilibrating process is difficult to demonstrate computationally because of the difficulty in coming up with initial beliefs that are both natural and satisfy the truth compatibility condition. Our results, therefore, shed some negative light on using equilibria as a solution concept for decision making in partially observable stochastic games.